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Introduction 
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) occur in conflict-ridden, weakened 
states in which one or more armed non-state actors that may be party to a DDR process 
have challenged the monopoly of power. Other actors may remain outside the formal DDR 
efforts and continue to undermine community security and to challenge the fledgling state 
and other armed competitors. The inception, escalation, longevity, and ending of armed 
conflicts often involves tangled regional dimensions that challenge the simplistic 
characterization of civil wars as being only internal. Over the last two decades, the UN as 
well as regional organizations, have taken a neutral third-party role in the increasingly 
challenging peace building operations around the world, from political missions to full-
fledged peacekeeping operations. In retrospect, the multilateral actors and applied 
researchers have tended to view the success of these efforts as mixed. In particular, 
reintegration has received insufficient attention and resources and may have an inadequate 
evidence base. Given that the global recession currently threatens the funding of 
multilateral peace building interventions, a pressing concern is to enhance the effectiveness 
and efficiency of international operations. The research community is being challenged to 
produce solid applied reintegration research that is relevant to both policy and planning.  
The research project aims to outline the key analytical and practical concerns regarding 
reintegration processes in Somalia, Nepal and Afghanistan. This present subsidiary country 
report on Somalia is divided into two main parts. The first part explores the processes, 
conditions and circumstances that influence decisions to join piracy groups in Somalia, as 
well as decisions to disengage from the groups and activities. A question of particular 
interest is whether the decision to join a piracy group is made by the individuals alone or 
influenced by others, such as family members and peers. The second part of the report 
looks at the Norwegian Church Aid’s (NCA) “Alternative Livelihood to Piracy” (ALP) project, 
which is facilitating the disengagement and reintegration of pirates in Somalia. Rather than 
being an evaluation of the ALP project, the report studies the processes of disengagement 
from piracy groups and reintegration into productive non-violent livelihood as well as the 
role a project can play in these processes in the Somali context. These insights hold wider 
relevance for programming for second generation reintegration programs with their 
increasing attention to community security and the critical linkages between social and 
economic reintegration.  
Theoretical and analytical perspectives  
A number of studies and research traditions have addressed various aspects of how 
individuals join and leave different types of reclusive, militant, extremist or criminal groups 
or scenes (for an overview, see Bjørgo and Horgan 2009:5–10). However, the traditional 
focus of this analytical interest has been on the processes of recruitment into the groups, 
rather than on disengagement and reintegration into mainstream society. The last 10–15 
years have seen an increased level of interest in the processes of disengagement or 
desistance from crime. Many of the factors and processes involved in leaving religious 
‘cults’, terrorist organizations, racist groups and criminal youth gangs appear strikingly 
similar, despite the great differences in ideological content, background and aspirations. The 
social movement literature (e.g., della Porta 1995) is one of the bodies of research that has 
addressed these issues, studying a wide variety of movements. A related approach is to 
analyse these processes as identity changes (Ebaugh 1988). Studies of the sociology of 
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religion of joining and leaving new religious movements (‘sects’) have also made significant 
contributions to theoretical development on these processes, including the understanding 
of push and pull factors and the role of disillusionment in the process of disengagement 
(e.g.,Wright 1987). Criminological studies on desistance from crime (e.g., Maruna 2001; 
Laub and Sampson 2001), particularly disengagement from criminal gangs (e.g., Decker and 
Lauritsen 2002; Pyrooz and Decker 2011) have also been applicable for the study of other 
fields. Studies on disengagement from racist and right-wing extremist groups (Bjørgo 
1997:193–246) are also relevant to a wide variety of other extremist or terrorist movements 
and groups (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009).  
A common theme in all these research traditions is the importance of social ties, both in the 
process of joining the group or movement as well as in the process of disengagement. 
Individuals typically join a group or movement because their friends or family members are 
involved (Sageman 2004:178) although they sometimes join despite family opposition. After 
disengagement, family, relatives and clan may play an important role in the individuals’ 
reintegration (Boucek 2009:219). A community can be a lived (‘socio-geographic’) place with 
varying degrees of belonging and an imagined community whose spatial boundaries are 
often shifting. When individuals join and leave various types of criminal or militant groups, 
relations with the mainstream community vary. In some cases, joining a stigmatized 
community means cutting most ties to mainstream society, which is also a powerful moral 
community. Being accepted back into the society is difficult due to the stigma and social 
rejection (Bjørgo 2009:33–36, 41–42). For other types of militant groups (such as Hamas, 
IRA), becoming a fighter is widely acclaimed as an act of heroism to defend the community.  
These processes are frequently described as criminal/extremist careers, typically with a 
beginning, a peak and an end. The various research traditions share the view that individual 
decisions to join or leave are usually the product of a mixture of factors and motivations 
working in tandem. Various forms of disillusionment are usually the main triggering factors 
(Bjørgo 2011). There is increasing evidence that the processes involved in joining and leaving 
criminal or militant groups are quite generic, and these patterns are relevant to piracy 
groups in Somalia. 
Based on their work on terrorism and violent extremism, Bjørgo and Horgan developed a set 
of theoretical models and concepts on exit processes and disengagement from armed 
groups. ‘Disengagement’ refers to changes in behavior and participation in social groups and 
activities. ‘Deradicalisation’ refers to changes in values and attitudes. Theories on 
disengagement processes are built around push and pull factors. Push factors are negative 
forces and circumstances that make certain social affiliations unattractive and unpleasant. 
Conversely, pull factors offer attractive and rewarding alternatives to a life of crime (Bjørgo 
2009:36). Bjørgo and Horgan’s conceptualization of disengagement processes is used in this 
study to map and highlight the informant’s processes of engaging with, and disengaging 
from, piracy groups in Somalia. In addition the concept of a multi‐centric notion of 
community is used. This analytical concept includes a citizen‐based community such as a 
national community, community of believers in a political cause or in a faith, and 
community as a particular kind of lived place, with a certain level of social cohesion. To date, 
only the latter reference has been recognized in the standard IDDRS guidelines and 
programming manuals. Viewing combatants as entering “a community” (as a close‐knit 
place) after they have completed a DDR program or returned to civilian life on their own 
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disregards the fact that they are often deeply entangled throughout the DDR process in the 
real or imagined political, social, or religious communities that initially motivated them to 
join armed groups. This may present grave obstacles to them leaving the group; or, on the 
contrary, they may enable a return to civilian life. 
Country setting and international interventions 
Somalia has undergone a protracted civil war, mass famine, and large emigration since the 
1991 fall of President Siad Barre’s regime. Somalia has been referred to as a failed state and 
experts have questioned the quality of international interventions in its violent conflicts 
(Lewis 2008:ix).  
The first UN intervention force, UNISOM I, took place in 1991, but had a small force and a 
limited mandate (Bøås 2009:91). It was followed by the US-led “Operation Restore Hope” in 
1992, which was drawn into the inter-clan conflicts. In 1993, two American military 
helicopters were shot down and images of dead US personnel, dragged through the streets 
of Mogadishu, were broadcast worldwide (Lewis 2008:7). As a result, the American and 
UNISOM II forces withdrew. United Nations agencies and NGOs relocated their 
headquarters to Nairobi (Kenya) for security reasons which became the base for 
international efforts in Somalia. In 2005, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
was established however, encountering problems, as it “found itself confronting public 
hostility to its claimed status” in Somalia (Lewis 2008:85). Al-Shabaab, a splinter group of 
the Islamic Court Union, was a major opponent of the TFG and controlled large parts of 
Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia. In 2006, Ethiopia intervened and defeated the 
Islamic Court Union, but the two-year-long direct engagement still did not improve the 
political situation (Bamfo 2010). In 2007 the African Union deployed a peacekeeping 
operation in Somalia; AMISOM1 with an extended mandate until 2012.  
In spite of the weak state structures, Somali society has a strong clan system. Both Islam and 
the traditional clan system underlie the informal institutions that manage social and 
economic activities (Lewis 2008). The various clans fight among themselves for territorial 
and resource control.  
After the overthrow of Siad Barre, different political and administrative units started to 
emerge. In 1991, Somaliland declared itself an independent state with a parliamentary-style 
government and functioning administrative machinery. In 1998, Puntland also established 
separate political institutions, without seeking complete independence from larger Somalia. 
The regional state of Puntland is still politically unstable, with a highly centralized power 
structure that creates safe havens for criminal groups such as pirates in the more 
decentralized areas. Piracy2 has been an increasingly concerning problem in Somali waters 
                                                     
1
  The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). 
2
  According to ICC International Maritime Bureau (2011:3), “piracy is defined in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as any of the following acts :  
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(i)  on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a 
pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).” 
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over the least 10 years. In 2008, the number of piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia 
almost doubled from the previous year (Middleton 2008:3). Reported piracy attacks and 
attempted attacks by Somali pirates in 2011 were the highest ever registered, and almost 
half of the total attacks reported worldwide were committed by Somali pirates3 (ICC 
International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre 2011). However, the Somali coast as 
a whole is far from being pirate-infested (Hansen 2009:5) as Puntland appears to be the 
base for most pirates in Somalia (Middleton 2008:4). Interestingly, piracy virtually vanished 
around Somalia for six months when the Islamic Courts Union was in power in 2006 (Hansen 
2009 and Middleton 2008). Hence, the problem of piracy may be understood both as an 
outgrowth of the war economy and an outcome of a weak or non-existent state power and 
an inadequate police and coast guard.  
Reintegration efforts in Somalia 
In 2001, UNDP’s Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCRP) proposed a pilot 
project to address small arms proliferation in Somalia. The main phase of the project began 
in September 2003 and ended in early 2005 (Menkhaus 2006:2). In September 2008, an 
independent assessment of the DDR project recommended focusing on broader causes of 
violence. This involved strengthening community-based mechanisms for preventing the 
emergence of new armed groups and tackling armed groups outside the DDR project. As a 
result, the UNDP promoted the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration/Armed 
Violence Reduction (DDR/AVR) project. In partnership with UNICEF and ILO, the DDR/AVR 
project launched a “Youth at Risk” initiative in 2011 within the Somali Community Safety 
Framework. This is a second-generation DDR project with a main focus on Community 
Security and economic reintegration.  
Other local and international organizations are also working with reintegration in Somalia. 
One of these is the Norwegian Church Aid which initiated the “Alternative Livelihood to 
Piracy” (ALP) project in 2010. The ALP project has three main objectives: awareness-raising 
to 50 percent of Puntland’s population about the negative effects of piracy, providing 600 
ex-pirates with vocational and life skills training, and successfully engaging ex-pirates in 
alternative income-generating activities (NCA 2010a). The ALP project is neither a 
reintegration program nor part of a wider DDR process. However, it provides alternative 
livelihood opportunities, which are important pillars for economic reintegration and can 
provide points for programmatic guidance for reintegration programs targeting ex-
combatants.  
Methodology 
The empirical material for this study was gathered in Kenya and Somalia in May and June 
2011. This report is based on interviews with 22 individuals,4 mainly ex-pirates, pirate 
associates and youth at risk of joining piracy. In addition, representatives from ministries in 
Puntland and Somaliland, as well as international and local organizations were interviewed 
(see the Appendix for the list of these interviewees). 
                                                     
3
  The number of attacks reported to ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre as of the 16
th
 of 
December 2011 was 421, 231 of which were committed by Somali pirates (ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy 
Reporting Centre 2011). 
4
  When informants are quoted in the text, they are referred to by number (for example, #14). 
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Two of the 22 interviewees had not considered joining piracy, but still participated in the 
ALP project. They were therefore excluded from the data analysis for entry and exit routes. 
Sixteen informants had been involved in piracy. Eleven of these had been active pirates, 
meaning they were integrated members of piracy groups. Three of the five remaining 
informants involved with piracy were in the process of joining a piracy group, but changed 
their minds. Another two female informants had a supporting role, selling khat and tea to 
pirates on shore. Their husbands also were pirates. In addition, there were four informants 
who were former members of militia groups; two from al-Shabaab and two from clan militia 
groups. These interviews contribute to understanding the complex Somali context of armed 
groups. They also show that the processes of engagement and disengagement in relation to 
piracy may, in some cases, also apply to members of other armed groups in Somalia. Ten 
informants including the four members of al-Shabaab and clan militias were interviewed in 
Nairobi and were self-integrated, meaning that they had not been part of a formal 
reintegration program. The 12 ALP participants were interviewed in Bossaso and Garowe, in 
Puntland. Seven of these had vocational training, and five participated in business skills 
training.  
It is important to note that the sample for this study is not representative for all Somali 
pirates, as only ex-pirates were interviewed. This means data were not collected from active 
pirates or people still involved piracy. All the informants can be classified as foot soldiers. 
Hence, the data is limited to lower-rank participants. Likewise, the data material does not 
include interviews with “successful” ex-pirates who may have retired from piracy with a 
significant amount of wealth. However, the study still provides a basis to show how and why 
young Somalis engage with, and disengage from, piracy groups.  
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PART I: Entry and exit processes  
Motives for entering piracy 
People get involved with armed groups for various reasons, including family background, life 
circumstances and social ties (Bjørgo 2011, Nesser 2010). While none of the informants in 
this study was forcefully recruited, peer pressure, poverty, and a lack of alternative 
livelihoods may pull and push youngsters into piracy. As Bjørgo and Horgan observed: 
“Individuals do not necessarily join extremist groups because they hold extremist views; they 
sometimes acquire extremist views because they have joined such a group for other reasons” 
(Bjørgo and Horgan 2009:3). 
Fifteen of the 16 individuals involved with piracy did so for economic reasons and/or lack of 
other life opportunities. Fourteen of these mentioned that the influence of friends, 
acquaintances or family members led them to join an armed group. Interestingly all four 
from al-Shabaab and clan militias also became involved for economic gain and joined 
through family and friends. Hence, the present data give credence to the theory that most 
young foot soldiers do not join because of strong identification with the group’s ideology 
and beliefs. Rather, they are pulled in by friends and family members for economic returns.  
Economic gain, lack of livelihood, and masculinities 
Poverty and lack of other appropriate livelihood opportunities are main factors pushing 
individuals into piracy in the Somali regions: 
It is claimed that people engage in piracy because they benefit more from it than from 
other alternative activities; either because there are no other alternatives (for example 
due to a lack of work opportunities), or because the benefits that can be achieved by 
piracy is so great that it draws recruits away from other relative good jobs. In other 
words, you are drawn into piracy because of opportunities for increased income. (Hansen 
2009:7). 
The field observations reflect underlying traditional gender norms and values, which often 
place men and women at different ends in terms of roles, responsibilities and opportunities. 
In everyday domestic life, men assume the role of breadwinners, warriors, protectors, status 
seekers and authority figures. A young man who takes on these roles gains recognition as a 
social adult (UNDP 2010:27). In Somalia, where protracted violence and droughts have 
destroyed livelihood assets such as houses, land and livestock, it is difficult for men to be 
breadwinners. Thus, to promote livelihoods and protect their self-dignity and masculine 
reputation, many men become vulnerable to the appeals of criminal and armed groups. 
Such groups clearly tap into young men’s gender identity and its current crises, in order to 
recruit them into criminal and violent activities (ibid:12).   
Without opportunities to gain employment or social position, young men in marginalized 
communities lack a legitimate path to make the transition from boyhood to manhood. In 
addition to income, protection and access to women, these groups offer young men a 
sense of belonging and purpose and means to achieve respect and recognition among 
their peers or communities. (UNDP 2010:12-13).  
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With few exceptions, the young interviewees appeared to come from economically deprived 
families. They either dropped out of school or never attended. Without the benefit of 
formal education and employable skills, piracy presented an attractive alternative access to 
income. A young pirate explained: “The market closed in our faces and we didn’t get any 
jobs. So it was a new door for us to get an income” (#14). Even though they knew piracy was 
haram5, meaning forbidden by Islam and unacceptable by local communities and religion, 
people still joined due to the lack of alternative income sources. One young man from 
Bossaso, who joined a piracy group at the age of 17, said he joined for the following reason: 
“For the lack of job. Here in the country there is nothing to do” (#3). 
Seeing friends who become rich from piracy can push other youth to explore similar 
opportunities involving easy access to money and increased attention from women. A group 
of young fishermen explained why they shifted to piracy from fishing: “After seeing some of 
the youth [pirates] that we knew riding expensive cars and throwing money here and there,” 
they shifted from fishing to piracy (#14). Another informant added: “When life became more 
expensive, and we saw the others at our age scatter money here and there, being able to get 
whatever they want, then we decided to be like them and become rich” (#16). 
These needs for income and employment do not merely affect those joining piracy but also 
those attracted to other types of militant groups in Somalia. An informant who joined a clan 
militia immediately after the collapse of President Siad Barres’s regime, claimed: “At that 
time, there was nothing you could do except joining the fight or stay at home like the 
women. There was no job or work to do, and no schools to go” (#8). He felt that being a 
member of a clan militia group was the best and only option for meeting his material needs. 
Another young man, who was recruited into al-Shabaab at the age of 17 with the promise of 
earning money, also noted: “They just told us they will provide us with a job and money. First 
they promised to pay us $200 first month. They gave us $50 and they told us they will give us 
the salary they promised next month and took us to Kismayo City” (#1). 
While a large majority of the youngsters join piracy in order to meet basic welfare needs, 
others see such groups as the surest conduits for quick and supplementary income. An 
informant left his family and traditional nomadic lifestyle to work in a restaurant in a coastal 
town. Through the job, he got in contact with the pirates: “They told me a lot about the 
hijacking, the money they received and then I joined them. I left the job as a waiter, and 
started cooking for them and giving them food” (#6).  
Having a job and regular income is therefore not a guarantee against the appeals of piracy 
groups. Members of more ideological-based groups may also be attracted by the promise of 
enormous economic benefits. A 21-year-old man and former member of al-Shabaab 
explained his decision: “I had a good job at that time. I was working in a  company. I earned 
$200 per month and worked there for four years” (#7). However, al-Shabaab had a more 
tempting offer: “They told me I would earn $1,000 per month. And get a Toyota Pickup. I 
also had free airtime; they got me a phone, free fuel and the vehicle. They paid me nicely 
                                                     
5
  Haram means ‘forbidden’ in Arabic, referring to anything that is forbidden by Islamic law. It represents the moral 
opposite of halal, an Arabic word for lawful or allowed. Haram also applies to ill-gotten wealth obtained through sinful 
acts, including money earned through cheating, stealing, corruption, murder, or any means that involves harm to 
another human being (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haraam). 
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and it was a good life” (#7). He became a contract killer for al-Shabaab, specializing in the 
murder of government officials. 
Recruitment into piracy 
Traditionally, Somalis have a strong clan and family system which shapes their actions and 
resource rights (Bøås 2009:91). Economic activities are usually family-run. Some activities 
are monopolized by certain families (Interview with UNICEF May 2011) and social networks 
and relationships play an influential role in youth’s livelihoods and life chances.  
Piracy groups are mostly clan-based. Many groups consist of a leader, family members and a 
network of friends: “In general, groups seem to be recruited from individuals with previous 
family or village ties” (Hansen 2009:34). An informant specifically noted: “The pirates were 
some people that I knew very well, and we were in contact from time to time. So I knew 
what they were doing and what they benefit from it. So I decided to join them in the end. I 
was 13 years old” (#16). 
Peers and schoolmates of members of pirate groups are ripe for recruitment: “I left school in 
eighth grade and joined some of my friends from school who became pirates to get rich” 
(#11). Local restaurants and coffee shops, where idle young men drink tea/coffee, chew 
khat, and converse, are also fertile grounds for recruitment: “The people know each other 
because we study in the same schools and live in the same areas. So I had an idea about 
them, and we met them in places like the coffee shops where everyone goes” (#12).   
Family members may also recruit into armed groups. An interviewee who worked as a 
fisherman with his uncle noted: 
I finished school and started working with my uncle. He was a fisherman, so I was helping 
him with fishing and whatever he needed help with. In the beginning, my uncle was 
working alone, but then they became a group. My uncle was driving the boat, and they 
were about 10 people in the group. One day they had problem with a ship cutting off 
their nets. From then on, the group started organizing themselves [to become pirates]. 
(#5) 
Despite his uncle being the group leader, it took some years for the young man to join. This 
was due to his mother’s strong objections. He recounted those objections: “Well you can 
die. There is a risk. She had heard stories of people in Mombasa. It is a difficult job. I could 
lose myself even” (#5). However, his uncle and friends eventually convinced him to join their 
group: “I heard stories about them, about what they received, money. I heard many stories. 
Most of my friends were in the groups. I saw my friends receiving money” (#5). 
This is a good example of how family members both encourage and discourage youth to join 
violent armed groups. In this particular case, the uncle’s influence and the prospect of 
sudden richness were pulling factors into the armed group, while the mother served as a 
barrier to group membership. Thus, an individual may make the decision to join a group, but 
peers and friends are strong influential factors.  
This supports Sageman’s research on membership in jihadist movements, which shows that 
recruitment is not necessarily a top-down process of brainwashing by group leaders. It is 
rather the “formation of a network of friendship that solidified and preceded formal 
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induction into terrorist organization” (Sageman 2004:107-108). While studying a group of 
men who joined al-Qaeda, Sageman found “Instead of a top-down process of the terrorist 
organization trying to recruit new members, it was a bottom-up process of young people 
volunteering to join the organization” (ibid:110). Similarly, Somali piracy group leaders seem 
to have a limited role in the recruitment of new members. Some of the pirates established 
new groups, and used ties of friendship and kinship to recruit members.  
An important observation is that 13 of the 16 informants involved with piracy noted 
economic motives, combined with influence of friends and relatives, as reasons for getting 
involved in piracy. Therefore, economic gain and social ties are strong factors that pull or 
attract Somalis into piracy activities. Lack of alternative income sources and the persuasion 
of relatives or friends may therefore make potential membership in piracy groups hard to 
resist. 
Ideology and political interests  
Ideology was not a strong motivating factor for joining piracy groups among our informants. 
However, five interviewees noted that they joined on political grounds and self-defense. 
They claimed to have gotten involved in piracy in response to illegal fishing in order to 
protect their interests and rights. One informant said: “We were a big group going together 
to fish. So when that happened [getting their nets cut off] to us many times, we had a 
meeting and decided to defend ourselves against them. So we brought our guns, went into 
our boats and defended ourselves. That’s how it started” (#2). 
Not every fisherman is a boat owner. Such fishermen usually join the boats of friends or 
relatives for a share of the surplus catch. Thus, fishing is organized around networks of 
friends and relatives, which can easily turn into piracy groups.  
Piracy is mostly prevalent in the decentralized villages in Puntland, where the state has little 
or no presence. There is hardly any functioning police force in these areas, and Puntland’s 
Coast Guard has demonstrated little effectiveness in fighting piracy at the Puntland coast. 
Many fishermen themselves assume the role of Coast Guards to protect their livelihoods. A 
former pirate explained the transformation from a fishing group to a piracy group as an act 
of heroism:  
While we were getting our daily life from the sea, some foreign ships attacked us, took 
our nets, fish and terrorized us. They opened hose water on us to push us to leave and 
they kept accusing us of being pirates. When that happened we decided to go back and 
defend our income, our sea, because no state was there any more that could defend our 
sea and the rights of the fishermen. So we agreed with each other to battle these people 
and defended ourselves, our income and our coast. We collected guns, no one cared 
about the risks that we could meet at the sea. We put our souls in front of us. No one 
cared or was afraid of death or being taken to another country to be put in prison. (#20) 
Initially, fishermen might have seen fighting illegal fishing as a legitimate motivation to start 
or join a pirate group. However, many fishing groups transformed into piracy groups purely 
for economic returns, as most of the hijacked ships were cargo ships rather than illegal 
fishing vessels. One of the theories of the origins of piracy presented in Hansen’s report 
suggests that: “Piracy started out as a defensive measure taken due to illegal foreign fishing, 
which over time has turned into professional piracy” (Hansen 2009:9) Hansen further note 
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that piracy is a highly profitable venture, which attracts people looking for substantial and 
easy money (Hansen 2009:10). Notwithstanding, many pirates still justified their activities as 
a stand against illegal foreign vessels and for the protection of their fishing rights.  
Barriers to engagement  
While there are general risk (push) factors towards certain delinquent behaviors or militant 
groups, some people still do not join (Horgan 2005:48). Many Somali young men are 
unemployed and vulnerable, but they still refrain from joining piracy or other armed groups. 
As earlier stated, relatives and friends are important sources of recruitment into armed 
groups. However, the same networks of friendship and family can also provide strong 
barriers to joining armed groups. More than half of the informants indicated that their 
family and local community members expressed objections to involvement in armed group 
activities. Parents were particularly vocal in trying to prevent their children from joining 
armed groups.  
A 19-year-old male informant, who had planned to join a pirate group, noted that his father 
quickly put an end to the plans. He claimed: “No, I didn’t contact any of these piracy groups. 
I had planned to join them when I heard and got an idea about what they were getting from 
hijacking. So I tell my father about my plan and he refused me to join” (#12). His father had 
raised him in the Islamic faith, which does not approve of piracy. However, the father was 
still worried that his son would be lured into a pirate group. He moved his son away from 
the coastal area and enrolled him in the ALP project’s vocational training.  The young man 
explained: 
My father was worried about me and decided to enroll me into this vocational training 
that he had heard about from his friend, the mayor. So his friend finished the whole 
registration and the things needed from me. Then my father came to me and told me 
about this training and that he had registered me and sent me to Garowe to take me far 
away from the sea environment. This is how I got involved with the training. (#12). 
In this particular case, the father was the main barrier to the son’s membership in a piracy 
group and his connections with the mayor enabled him to enroll his son in the ALP project. 
The ALP project provided skills training and a potential alternative income source, as well as 
a basis for relocation. The combination of these three barrier factors proved stronger than 
the motivation for joining a pirate group.  
Another 15-year-old male informant decided to join a pirate group due to a difficult family 
background, including the early death of his mother and an abusive step-mother. His father 
was a fisherman. The young man was uneducated and unemployed, and twice tried to join 
piracy groups. However, his father physically prevented him from joining a piracy group and 
even removed him from a boat. The young man said: “I got involved with them twice and 
both of the times my father brought me back home” (#15). His father arranged for him to 
join the ALP project. Today, he is studying language and computer science.  
A 29-year-old male interviewee, with three wives and eight kids, also considered joining 
piracy. He was originally a pastoralist, but, due to changing environmental conditions and 
drought, he moved his family to a more central area in order to find work. It turned out 
unsuccessful, leading him to consider joining a pirate group: “I planned to join piracy. I didn’t 
meet them, I just had an idea of joining them. But before doing that, I heard about the [ALP] 
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training and I joined it” (#18). The skills-training gave him a potential livelihood alternative, 
preventing him from going into piracy. His family also influenced the final decision: “My 
wives did not allow me to join piracy. They refused the money coming from something that 
was not acceptable in Islam” (#18). 
The notion of haram and ill-gotten money was used by families of many of the informants to 
prevent their male family members from getting involved in piracy. Religious norms are 
strong factors in dissuading people from involvement with pirate groups. The religious 
leaders in the ALP project built on these norms when recruiting participants to the project. 
As one interviewee explained: 
I was planning to go to the sea and hijack these ships, but before I did that some of the 
elders and religious leaders came to us and made us aware about what we were about to 
do and what our religion says about it. That the profit we get from it is considered haram. 
We became more aware, and were promised a program to learn new skills for an 
occupation and a new life far away from piracy. We took to us what the religion advised 
us and went to register for the training through the mayor (#14). 
The religious leaders clearly made an impact against piracy. By supporting local Muslim 
leaders in their efforts to discourage ties with pirate groups and offering alternatives in job 
training, NCA has successfully managed to build on religious norms within the Somali society 
to fight piracy locally.  
Engagement as pirates 
In order to design effective reintegration programs, it is important to understand the 
dynamics of the specific criminal or armed group. The nature of the group, especially 
structure, activities, status, roles, and bonds among members, influences the 
disengagement process.  
Bjørgo and Horgan argue against the conventional saying: “Once a terrorist, always a 
terrorist.” This is also the case with many other forms of criminal involvement and most of 
the informants in the sample were only involved with piracy groups for a relatively short 
time: 
An increasing body of gang research shows that gang memberships turns out to be a 
temporal experience for most youths involved in such groups. According to Thornberry, 
Huizinga and Loeber, the large majority of gang members quit after a brief stay in the 
group; less than half stayed for more than a year. (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009:7-8) 
Of the 11 informants who were active members of a pirate group, only two had been active 
for more than a year. The majority had just been in the group for a couple of months or 
joined for one or two hijackings. A young boy who joined a piracy group at the age of 13, but 
soon decided to quit, said: 
I joined them two times but we failed on the two missions. We went to a village and 
started going on our hijacking mission with two boats. We stayed in the sea for two 
nights, and we couldn’t find anything so we returned back to land. Then we went back to 
the sea, and this time we stayed three nights. Then I decided to quit, give up. (#16).  
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Hence, the notion of “once a pirate, always a pirate” does not apply to those in the sample. 
Most engaged in hijacking a couple of times and then left the group.6 As Bjørgo and Horgan 
point out: “In reality, [...], most individuals involved in terrorism eventually disengage from it 
one way or another. Similarly few terrorist movements last more than a few months, in rare 
cases years, before coming to an end” (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009:7). This also seems to be the 
case for many Somali pirate groups. The more amateur groups dissolve after a short time, as 
they do not have sufficient experience, skills and equipment for effective raids. Some get 
lost at sea, or end up in prison.  
The organization of Somali pirate groups has changed over the years. The 2008 piracy boom 
led to fragmentation of groups into smaller and more varied entities (Hansen 2009:34). 
Many of these small groups were not well-organized and consisted of less-experienced 
fishermen who just wanted to earn extra money. In the view of an informant: “There were 
no specific roles inside the group. We didn’t have any leader. We just did everything 
together” (#20). 
Pirate groups are normally a loose constellation that consists of a leader and about 12 to 35 
people (Hansen 2009:34, 36). An informant who was elected leader of a group of fishermen 
that turned into piracy, explained: “We divided ourselves into two groups. One group was on 
the sea while the other was waiting outside the water giving us directions” (#2). Other 
informants confirmed that this was standard operating procedure. The sea-based team 
undertook the hijacking, while the land-based team took custody of the hijacked ship and 
provided other support services. Some individuals shifted between the teams: “I was in the 
boat with my gun and also climbing onto the other ship. Afterwards, I was also attending to 
the crew on the boat that was hijacked” (#4). Despite many pirate groups being loosely 
organized, they seem to have a clear hierarchical arrangement:  
Most of the time, I was in the boat. My uncle and I were functioning as guards to look out 
for what may come from outside while the others were inside the ship. For one week, we 
kept it at the sea and then we brought it close to Eyl. Then it spent 21 days in Eyl. My 
responsibilities in Eyl were to bring what the group needed from town and cook. I was the 
youngest, so I just got these kinds of jobs. (#5). 
The money earned also varies according to rank and status in the group:  
When the ship got to Eyl, the boss contacted the place where the ship was coming from, 
and they got a ransom of $300,000. I received $10,000. I was young and low rank so the 
bosses took most of it. My uncle was the second commander in the group and the driver 
for the boat. He received $40,000 for this job. He had been doing this for a long time. (#5)  
Informants classified as foot soldiers typically got around $10,000–$20,000. However, piracy 
groups work on the “no prey, no pay” system (Hansen 2009:36). In other words, in the event 
of failed raids, they do not get paid. The young informant who joined his uncle’s group 
remarked: “We had only one successful hijacking. So I only got paid once” (#5).  
In terms of financing piracy, some of the amateur groups mobilized initial resources: 
                                                     
6
  We interviewed ex-pirates who mainly had been involved with the less organized pirate groups. Some of the more 
advanced groups probably last longer, and their members are likely to be involved for a longer time. Still, those groups 
are likely to have a considerable turnover of personnel.  
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We didn’t have any money, but you know, most Somalis have weapons, so we collected 
from here and there. Sometimes we got some money from other people by begging them 
to give us some money. But of course we don’t tell them the truth that we needed this 
money to buy guns (#20). 
The more established groups have their own financiers, as interviewee #3 explained: “There 
were four financiers who provided us with everything, including weapons. And they were 
the ones getting the largest share of the money” (#3). Being an investor can be quite 
beneficial if the raids are successful. According to another informant: “There are people 
whose business is to provide the pirates with what they need. So when we succeeded on 
our mission, then we pay them twice of what they invested. In this way, they also benefit” 
(#13). Support seems to be given on credit and repaid after successful raids. Profits are 
often invested into new raids: “The pirates tend to be self-financing and the money from 
hijackings is reinvested in new attacks” (Hansen 2009:37). This also means that if raids are 
unsuccessful, the financiers risk losing their investment. Local businesses providing goods on 
credit are also not guaranteed payment. 
Managing family relations and community pressure  
Many families and local communities are against piracy as they believe it violates Islamic 
teachings and values. Thus, for many informants, their family relations changed when they 
went into piracy. Some tried to keep their activities secret in order not to offend the 
sensibilities of relatives. Informant #4 explained this strategy: 
My family did not have any idea about what I was doing. I hid the money because they 
would start asking me where I got it from. And at the same time, they would refuse to 
receive any money from me as they consider it haram. (#4) . 
To make it easier to hide earnings, some pirates moved into rented houses with fellow 
pirates. Thus, involvement in piracy also leads to a change in community and social 
relationships. An informant noted: “I joined my friends planning to become a pirate and 
hijack ships to get money. So we decided to rent a house. I left home and moved in with 
them” (#13). He told the family that he was going to look for a job. Some people become 
totally isolated from their families while in the piracy group: “The family didn’t have any 
idea where to look for us. Even those who knew what we were doing, didn’t know where to 
find us or where to search for us” (#20). 
Many of Puntland’s coastal communities are strongly against piracy. Pirates spend lavishly, 
which causes inflation and creates problems for already financially distressed people in local 
communities. In addition, they engage in other unacceptable social activities, such as drug 
abuse and bringing in prostitutes: “The communities consider the pirates themselves and 
their bodies as haram. So they avoid those they know are in that group” (#20).  
Thus, in spite of the riches the successful pirates can show off, there is a considerable stigma 
attached to their social identity as pirates in the local community. 
Exit and disengagement 
The process of leaving criminal groups depends on several factors, such as duration in the 
group, group character, group role, status and experiences, and ties to other group 
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members and people outside the group: “The reason of disengagement can be numerous, 
conflicting, competing and exceptionally complex even within a single case” (Horgan 
2009:27). Other researchers point to the importance of disillusionment (Bjørgo 2011) and 
life-threatening episodes (Decker and Lauritsen 2002) as turning points.  
All of the ex-pirates interviewed disengaged voluntarily. However, quite a number of Somali 
pirates are imprisoned in and outside of Somalia and some die at sea during piracy 
operations.This section will look at why and how the individuals in the sample leave piracy 
and the most prevalent pull and push factors.  
Individual and covert exit 
As shown earlier, many joined pirate groups in Somalia due to peer pressure. Despite this, 
all 11 informants actively engaged in piracy decided to leave on their own, based on an 
individual decision: “I left alone. But I met others [who had quit] here in Nairobi. Not from 
the same group, but different groups.” (#5) Most informants joined piracy with friends or 
family members but left alone. They also choose to leave covertly in order to avoid 
confrontation: “I put the gun somewhere, and I didn’t tell them I was leaving. I told them I 
would be back the next day” (#5). A majority of these were foot soldiers who were not 
entrusted with the most valuable information. There was less of a risk for being hunted 
down and sanctioned by the group. Furthermore, the person would not be so hard to 
replace. Only two of the active pirates mentioned fear of reprisals from the group they 
belonged to. For members of al-Shabaab there is a greater risk related to disengaging. One 
of the former members of al-Shabaab explained: 
Going out of the group is too difficult. If you tell them you want to contact your family, they 
refuse. They kept telling us that we are in jihad, so we must forget about everything else. 
When I came back, I told them I needed to go back to my parents, that I couldn’t stay there. 
They refused and sent me back to the group. They were killing the people who insisted on 
leaving. (#1) 
Disillusionment and economic failure 
Disillusionment is a common cause for leaving extremist groups (Bjørgo 2011, Wright 1987). 
This was one of the motives for disengagement for several of the informants. The young 
man who started working as a cook for the pirates did not benefit much from his career 
change: “They did not pay me. They were expecting to get profit from hijacking. But since 
they had no successful raids I did not get anything. Not even a dollar” (#6). As explained 
earlier, the pirates work on a “no prey no pay” system. Consequently, many believe they will 
make a lot of money, but receive nothing.  
Two of the informants were not able to make productive use of the money they earned 
from piracy. A young ex-pirate who joined when he was 17 told about his lifestyle as a 
pirate: “I was busy making friends and spending money on chewing khat and having fun” 
(#3). He did buy a car: “I bought a second-hand [car] for that [piracy] money but I had an 
accident with it, and it got destroyed” (#3). In the end, the young pirate realized that even 
though he got money, it did not take him very far: “The money finished by spending it here 
and there, so I decided not to go back to piracy” (#3). Another ex-pirate only participated in 
one raid. Even though it was successful, he still decided not go back: “You see, another 
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group caught me and stole the money. They were masked and robbed me on my way to the 
town with the money. After that, I decided not to go back” (#4). 
Not all who left pirate groups felt disillusioned. An ex-pirate participated in three raids over 
three years; two that were successful and one that failed. During that time, he earned 
$70,000. He was not disillusioned with piracy. However, his wife was not happy with his 
profession: “I married her at the end of my time working with the pirates. But she wasn’t 
happy with what I was doing and she asked me to quit. I stopped because of her and the 
injury I had on my arm from a car accident” (#2). 
Drop-outs from gangs and extremist groups frequently mention group/cause loyalty as a 
barrier to leaving (Bjørgo 1997:222). An interesting finding is that hardly any of the 
informants identified group/cause loyalty as a barrier to disengagement. That was not even 
the case with the two informants who were ex-members of the Islamist al-Shabaab militia. 
This further supports the argument that most people do not necessarily join radical 
movements due to radical beliefs (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009:3). Since many enter groups 
through friends, family, and acquaintances, it is natural to assume that they have loyalty to 
the group, even if they do not feel loyalty to the cause. However, in the sample, only one ex-
pirate cited loyalty to the group as a barrier for leaving. He had started a piracy group with 
his friends, but left before they managed to do their first raid. He knew that his friends 
would be disappointed with him, and he felt he was betraying them. However, his family 
had a bigger influence over him and was able to remove him from the group.   
Hardship and risk  
Being a pirate is not as luxurious as many expect. It demands a lot of effort and hard work, 
especially for the lower rang foot soldiers. Six out of the 11 actively engaged in a piracy 
group emphasized the risk and hardship connected with the job: 
You can’t imagine the kind of life that we were living on that time. It’s hard life, the 
person realizes how bad it was when he gets out of it. You have to be awake the whole 
night and the whole day waiting for ships. Some time we get lost at sea, losing the 
direction. Sometimes you run from your colleagues as you don’t trust them when they are 
far away and you don’t know who they are. So there is no life there. (#20). 
Such negative experiences push pirates towards disengagement: “It is bad from the 
beginning this hard work that we are doing. This affects their decision to go back and quit 
piracy, especially for the ones who did not get anything from it” (#20). The hard work and 
seeing friends get injured, die or imprisoned are major push factors in exiting piracy and 
other groups: “My plan was to work along with them. But some of the people in the group 
got injured, and I left because of that. With one of the ships, two people got injured and 
died” (#22). 
The role of family, relatives, and friends in facilitating disengagement 
Seven of 16 informants stated that they disengaged due to family or community objection: 
“The community wasn´t happy. That’s why I left. And my mum. They were saying that what 
we were doing was haram and not good” (#5). The community’s discontent (particularly his 
mother’s dissatisfaction with his work), combined with experiencing people getting injured 
and dying during hijacking, produced a strong combination of push factors. He also earned 
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some money from a successful raid that made it possible for him to leave. This represented 
a pull factor: “I got the money, and I then left the group. I used the money I had earned to 
leave the group. I first went to Mogadishu, then Kenya and Nairobi” (#5).  
Not all low-level soldiers have enough money to leave. Close family and relatives may help 
create exit routes. Six out of 11 who were actively engaged in piracy got help from family. 
Fathers can play a crucial role when it comes to getting their sons out of pirate groups.  
In one raid, one guy died. Then my father got to know about me being in the group, as the 
whole community was invited to the funeral. So my father met the leader of the group 
and almost started a fight with him. But the leader of the group said that he had never 
forced me to join and that my father could take me back. (#6). 
His father thought it was a risky business and told him to change his lifestyle. In order to 
prevent the son from re-engaging with the group or other armed groups he made 
arrangements for the son to be relocated: “My father sold some camels so that I would get 
some transport to come to Nairobi. I was very happy. Cause it was not a nice life. Even the 
religion does not allow it” (#6). 
Another father took action when he heard about his son joining the pirates: “He searched 
for me and took me back home. He became very angry with me, of course. Mum also when I 
got back to the house. And she was one of the main reasons why I decided to go back 
home” (#13). The mother was his main motive for disengaging. However, the father got him 
enrolled into the Alternative Livelihood to Piracy (ALP) training.  
Families also help ex-fighters to sustain themselves when they have no other means of 
income. The majority of the informants living in Nairobi did not have a stable job and were 
supported by family. Many lived with friends who took care of them. Social networks, 
family, relatives, and friends are therefore crucial in creating exit routes for young pirates 
and providing for them afterwards. None of the informants cited severed family ties or fear 
of stigmatization from the community as barriers to disengagement. Many stated that they 
felt disregard from the community while in the group. However, nobody expressed 
experiencing considerate concerns of stigmatization after leaving.  
An important variable is the duration of membership and level of integration into the piracy 
group. The more secrets with which the person has been trusted, the harder and more risky 
it is to disengage from the group (Bjørgo 2009:47). Also, the longer the person has stayed 
with the group, the harder it is to leave, especially if cutting outside ties had been a 
consequence of joining: “The shorter time they have stayed in the gang, the more easily they 
adapted to an ordinary, non-delinquent lifestyle” (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009:8). 
As most of the active members of piracy in the sample (as well as the informants from al-
Shabaab and clan militia groups) had stayed in the group less than a year, few faced severe 
problems afterwards. They were welcomed back and received support from the family. This 
confirms research from other extremist groups, where families frequently play a crucial role 
in the disengagement process (Bjørgo 2009:47; 2009:8; Boucek 2009:219). 
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Religion and ALP project 
Religious leaders play a central role in the Alternative Livelihood to Piracy (ALP) project: 
“Our religious leaders made us aware about piracy activities and how it doesn’t belong to 
our religion” (#16). Religious leaders also managed to reach the pirates while they were 
working. 
We didn’t meet them [the religious leaders], but we listened to their sermons on the 
radio. They talked about piracy, what our religion says about it, and how we are 
considered by the other Muslims. We were hearing these sermons while we were working 
at sea or on shore. This affected on our decision to go back and quit piracy. Especially for 
the ones who didn’t get anything from it. So I quit and came back to town, and joined the 
[ALP] training a month later. (#20). 
Religious sermons, in combination with an offer of alternative livelihood training, can be the 
final factor pushing people to disengage. However, as much as the religious aspect appeals 
to people, the lack of jobs is a difficult challenge:   
It [piracy] is not something good, according to religion. The religion does not accept 
attacking somebody and robbing them. And it is not something that even the community 
like. They are not happy about it. But most of the people are jobless, which means you try 
to survive. In Eyl, most of the people in the community were not happy. The sheiks were 
not happy with piracy. The clan leaders and elders were not happy with it. It is not a 
sustainable life to rob someone. All the leaders were against it. However, they can only 
give advice, as there are no other job opportunities. The sheiks preach in the communities 
but the leaders of the sea people [pirates] did not respond well to this. They tell the 
young boys that you can get a lot of money, that they can change their life. (#6) 
Thus, the ALP project can be seen as a well-targeted strategy trying to offer alternative 
livelihood training. Eight of the informants identified the lack of other means of livelihood as 
a barrier to disengagement. However, due to its small size, the project is only able to touch 
the tip of the iceberg, as youth unemployment is a widespread problem across all of 
Somalia.  
Re-engagement 
Those who drop out of a criminal or extremist career do not necessarily stop their 
involvement forever. Recidivism into criminal involvement (Maruna 2001:69–71) or re-
engagement into violent extremism (Horgan 2009:29) is often an option, sometimes forced 
by lack of viable alternatives or rejection from the social surroundings. None of the 
informants in the sample claimed that they wanted to re-engage with piracy. Due to the 
covert character of leaving the group there were no transition period, and all quit with 
immediate effect. This also meant completely cutting ties with the group and having no, or 
very limited, contact with other group members. Relocation facilitated disengagement, but 
it also prevented reengagement. An ex-pirate was grateful to his father for relocating him to 
another community: “If I stay in one of the towns in Puntland maybe I would join another 
group” (#6). 
The major risks of people going back to armed groups are still related to the basic reasons 
why they joined in the first place. When an ex-pirate in Nairobi was asked if he was thinking 
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of going back to Somalia his answer was clear: “No, never. There are no jobs there. So I 
might join the wrong people and groups” (#4).   
In hindsight, after staying out of a piracy group for some time, attitudes toward piracy 
groups changed. An ex-pirate radically changed his view: “It is bad. To attack innocent 
people, that is not nice in a humanitarian way. Otherwise it is risky. And if you get the 
money, it is not halal. Not the work in the lawful way that Allah accepts. God will punish you” 
(#6). Religious and moral regrets were clear among other ex-pirates as well: “I am 
disappointed because my whole work was haram” (#3). One of the informants clearly stated 
that he was now distancing himself from violence: “No, I wouldn´t have joined an armed 
group even if it would have given me sustainable livelihood. Because I don’t like violence” 
(#4). 
Changes in life situations also hinder re-engagement (Bjørgo 2009:40). Some moved on to 
new phases of their lives, where there was little space for membership in criminal or armed 
groups. A 24-year-old student, who had been living in Nairobi for the last four years, 
expressed that he does not wish to go back to piracy: 
No, my mind is busy with how to be an educator. I want to become a professor. I became 
a father and a husband, and there are responsibilities on my shoulders. Also I don’t want 
to give my kids ill-gotten money. (#3). 
Based on his study of extremist groups, Bjørgo describes this tendency to “age out” of 
extremism or crime as normal process and a typical pull factor. “At some point, activists in 
militant nationalistic or racist youth groups feel that they are getting too old for what they 
are doing. They no longer have the same need for excitement; they have less energy and 
want to calm things down” (Bjørgo 2009:39). An ex-pirate expressed relief that he could 
change his lifestyle and move on: “Am sorry for what I did before because I now know that 
what we were doing was not right. I felt that I could not live a normal life but now am happy 
that am leading a straight life and I can look forward for a better and brighter future” (#11). 
Not all changed their views on the activities in which their group was engaged. One 
informant had no regrets and justified his involvement in piracy. 
No, I have no regrets and nothing was bad. As I worked closely with my uncle, and he was 
a bit up in the system, I had no problems. Yes, it was the right thing to do. It was our duty. 
It was our duty, and we had to do it. The boats came and destroyed our nets. (#5)  
However, he also clearly stated he did not want to go back: “I don’t want to go back [to 
Somalia]. He [the uncle] might tell me that I have to come back and join them again. I don’t 
want that, it is a difficult job” (#5). 
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PART II: Disengagement and reintegration programming  
The second part of this research report will take a closer look at disengagement and 
reintegration programming related to exit processes from piracy groups. It will look at the 
Norwegian Church Aid’s “Alternative Livelihood to Piracy” (ALP) project and focus on the 
project’s components of disengagement and reintegration. As mentioned earlier, despite 
the project not being a DDR intervention, its livelihood and social reintegration approach to 
exiting a criminal armed group holds wider significance for reintegration programming.  
The Alternative Livelihood to Piracy project 
The Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) is one of the few organizations that have continued 
working and being present in some of the most conflict-affected areas in the Somali regions. 
In 2009, NCA commissioned a survey to assess counter-piracy initiatives in Puntland. It 
found widespread effects of piracy and youth vulnerability to conscription (NCA 2010a:5). 
The study also revealed widespread antipathy towards piracy, based on the religious belief 
that any gain from piracy is haram. Religious leaders had already spearheaded an initiative 
against piracy, using Koranic teachings (ibid). In 2010, the NCA launched a three-year project 
aimed at reducing piracy in the coastal areas of Puntland. This project was undertaken in 
close partnership with the State Government of Puntland, in particular the Ministry of 
Justice, Religious Affairs and Rehabilitation (MoJRAR).  
The three main objectives of the Alternative Livelihood to Piracy (ALP) project are: 
awareness-raising about the negative effects of piracy to at least 50% of the population in 
Puntland, providing 600 ex-pirates with vocational life-skill training, and have these 
successfully engage in alternative means of livelihood (NCAa 2010:1). The main target 
groups are youth between the ages of 15 and 25 who have been actively involved in piracy 
activities, particularly as foot soldiers. In addition, the project targets community members 
in Eyl, Bandarbeyla, Bargaal, Bossaso town and Garowe. The program was later opened up 
for women making a living of piracy and/or wives whose husband were killed or in jail due 
to piracy activities (NCA 2011:12).  
Before starting training, participants are selected for one of three courses (electricity, 
carpentry or masonry), depending on their knowledge. The courses last three months and 
are a mix of theory and practice. Two hundred participants get just business-skills training 
for five days and receive a seed grant of $300 in order to start their own businesses.  
Religious leaders have continued to play a central role through awareness-raising, engaging 
in anti-piracy rallies and campaigns, integrating anti-piracy messages in the Friday prayers in 
Mosques and radio broadcasts, and by encouraging disengagement and recruitment into 
the ALP project. 
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian Ship owners’ Association and the 
Norwegian Shipping Insurance Company (DNK) are the main donors.  
Program coherency in promoting disengagement and reintegration  
“DDR is effective-or not effective- not so much due to organization and character of a given 
DDR program, but due to a host of macro- and micro-factors in specific country contexts” 
(Stankovic, Torjesen and Bleie 2010:7). 
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Understanding the broader social, political and economic conditions that shape the 
development in specific post-war situations is therefore crucial (ibid 2010:7). Colletta and 
Muggah (2009) developed a typology of macro- and micro-determinants that shapes the 
condition of insecurity in post-war states. The macro determinants are the character of the 
armed conflict, nature of peace processes and governance capacity. The micro 
determinants7 are community-level absorptive capacities, character of armed groups and 
communities and mix of incentives such as monetary benefits, employment and basic 
services etc (Colletta and Muggah 2009:432). 
In parts of Somalia there are still armed conflicts and clashes. In addition to creating large 
security challenges it has caused extensive damage to the economic, political and social 
structures, making the conditions for the DDR processes particularly challenging.  
The ALP mainly focuses on livelihood opportunities and employment. Due to the size of the 
project and the limited target groups, the project cannot and do not intend to target the 
larger macro-factors. The project instead stresses micro- and meso-determinants, such as 
the labor market, monetary benefits, and employment opportunities locally. This study will 
mainly focus on economic reintegration in these areas. However, it is important to stress 
that a more comprehensive approach, including sociopolitical integration need to be 
included in larger reintegration efforts.  
Skills training 
“Economic reintegration is at the heart of the wider reintegration process, and remains 
central to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants.” (IDDR:40).  
Alternative and non-violent means of income are crucial for reintegration processes. Skills 
training is one component of economical reintegration that, when matched with the real 
requirements of the labor market, may enhance employability (IDDR:45). 
The 12 informants from the ALP project valued the project as a positive opportunity: “It was 
a good training that you benefit from. Learning new skills, which helps you get opportunities 
for work, get income and also become an active person in the community” (#14). However, 
they also wanted the training to last longer: “It was very good, but the training was too 
short” (#13). A short training period means that participants do not get to learn and acquire 
necessary professional skills. This makes it difficult for them to compete in the labour 
market.  
Religious leaders in Puntland suggested that the ALP vocational training should be extended 
to at least a year for the electricity courses and six to eight months for the others. A review 
of the project in February 2011 showed that vocational training should be extended, and be 
in line with the Puntland’s Ministry of Education’s vocational-skills curriculum. The Ministry 
of Education’s vocational-skills training lasts from six to nine months, depending on the 
course (NCA 2011:13).  
However, in order to prolong the training, the project will either need further financial 
support or to reduce the number of beneficiaries. Business-skills training does not require 
the same amount of time, however five days of training may be too short. Some of the 
                                                     
7
 Could also be defined as meso-determinants, as it concerns the community level. 
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business-skills participants also expressed that they would want an advanced course in 
order to expand their established small-scale businesses.  
Employment opportunities 
A general lack of employment opportunities, parallel war economies, and shattered 
economies with dismantled markets characterizes war and post-war contexts (IDDR:40). 
Employment creation, income generation, and reintegration are particularly challenging. 
Experience has shown that a main constraint to reintegration is the economic context, with 
labor market absorption and access to productive assets in particular (IDDR:40–41). 
Graduates of reintegration programs are far from certain to find employment and a stable 
income.  
A participant of the ALP’s vocational skills training faced difficulty searching for a job after 
graduating. He tried to get a job, but without results. He estimated that four people from his 
carpentry training group of 15 were employed: “The market is somehow in a sleeping state. 
There are few carpenter workshops, which effects on the number of employees who also are 
few” (#13). Five out of the seven interviewees who had gone through vocational-skills 
training had some type of work. However, none of them had any permanent job or 
sufficient source of income. A graduate from masonry training managed to find a job, but 
employment was sporadic and did not provide a stable income:  
There are not many job opportunities. I am now working building a house. I have a family 
to feed so I am working. Now the job that I have got, it’s for one month. But sometimes it 
happens that I don’t get any contracts for jobs and then I have to work the days that I get, 
even if it is only one. (#18). 
“Skills training does not by itself create employment.” (IDDR:45). It is important that 
vocational training target actual needs in the labor market. “Vocational training should not 
be offered in occupations and trades that are already saturated or that are likely to become 
saturated in the future. This will only create disillusionment and aggravate the economic 
and security situation” (IDDR:43). The private and public sectors must therefore be included 
in designing skills training and conducting market surveys.  
According to a NCA’s annual report from 2010, 50 of 100 trainees had either started their 
own businesses, or were employed in electric or construction companies during the first 
year of implementation of the ALP project (NCA 2010b). Again, half of the 100 trainees went 
through business-skills training and received seed grant money. Thirty-two of these own 
shops or are part of a cooperative (ibid). Only 18 of the 50 receiving vocational training were 
employed at that time. Hence it was easier for participants doing business-skills training to 
get an income relatively soon after graduation than for those doing vocational-skills training. 
As a result of a 2001 ALP project review, NCA now suggests expanding vocational courses to 
include professions required by the market such as welding, auto repair, tailoring, and 
information technology.  
Links to the market 
Employment creation relies on existing businesses and the private sector (IDDR:31). This 
applies to Somalia in particular, where the state is weak but the clan system is still strong 
and functional.  
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Building a close partnership with the private sector is indispensable to creating 
opportunities to absorb ex-combatants in the labor market. Private sector actors should 
be consulted from the initial program design stage so that reintegration assistance can 
target actual needs in the labor market (IDDR:32). 
Establishing close ties to the private sector through apprenticeship, internships and 
employment-subsidy programs are crucial employment-creation initiatives. An example of 
this is the Garowe Vocational Training Centre (GVTC), which is the local NGO providing 
vocational-skills training for the ALP project. The GVTC has made an apprenticeship 
agreement with Nugaal Electrical Company (NEC), the local power company in Garowe. The 
graduates from the electricity training have a better chance of getting into the labor market 
through the apprentice agreement. This has also benefitted participants from other training 
programs. A graduate from the carpentry training also got employment doing construction 
for the NEC: “I work with the NEC company. I am not NEC staff, I am working with them on 
external contracts, and I am also working for myself. The length of the contract depends on 
the construction designed” (#14). 
The trainers in the vocational centers are also important links to the job market. One of the 
participants in the ALP project works in external projects with the teacher of the electricity 
training from which he graduated: “I have practiced my skills as I got a part time job with the 
electrical engineer who was my teacher. He calls me to accompany him when he doing 
electrical installation” (#11). In addition, the trainers and also religious leaders are used as 
guarantees for the employees, which can be a crucial factor for employment in Somalia. 
However, there is a need for formal links and agreements with local companies: “Yes they 
[GVTC] were helping me trying to find a job. But I haven’t got one yet” (#13). 
Self-established small-scale businesses 
Based on the interviews and NCA’s 2010 project review, business-skills training 
accompanied with a seed grant proved efficient in quickly getting a stable income. The five 
people interviewed who had done business-skills training and received the seed grant had 
all started their small businesses.  
A former service provider to piracy groups joined the business-skills training while her 
husband was in jail for piracy. After the training, she opened up a small shop, selling dry 
goods, soft drinks, soap and some clothing. She was able to provide for herself and her 
children. “I benefited from this training. It helped me to get a new start, a different job and 
an income. And business skills also” (#19). An ex-pirate, who was married with two kids, was 
also positive to the business-skills training: “We got trained in how to make and open a 
small business, how to make use of cash book to know what we sell and the other expenses” 
(#16). He applied in practice what he had learned, and started his own small shop: “I bought 
small stuff, what my budget allowed me to buy. Like cigarettes, soft drinks, and mineral 
water. I increase the price on the things to get a profit. And today I earn so much from it so 
that I can feed my family and kids” (#16).  
This supports the UN’s IDDR statement that training should respond to the requirement of 
the informal sector, which is where most micro-enterprises emerge (IDDR:43). In the 
present economic and political context of Somalia, small-scale shops and self-employment 
may be the easiest way to get an income rapidly.  
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Social ties 
As shown in the first part of this report, family, relatives, and friends facilitate and hinder 
both engagement with and disengagement from piracy. This also seems to be the case when 
seeking employment. Chances of getting jobs may depend on clan structures, as the clan 
provides important entry points to the job market for its members. The ALP project has 
through the business skills training and seed grant managed to embark on these processes. 
Participants who did business-skills training received $300 in seed grant money, which is 
insufficient capital for opening a small-scale business.  
However, the $300 seed grant stimulated further support from relatives or loans from larger 
businesses. With crucial support from family and relatives, ALP graduates were able to get 
enough start-up capital to open their private shops.  
Four of the five interviewed from the business training received support from relatives: “I 
got support from my father, who gave me $200. So I opened a shop with $500, not $300” 
(#20). A woman opened a shop in her house, also with the assistance of her family: “I 
opened this shop with the support from my relatives who added me some money” (#17). Her 
relatives had some larger stores, so she got goods on credit from them. It cost $1,000 to 
open the shop, and she still owes $500 to her relatives. She is paying it off, little by little, as 
she gets a surplus.  
Graduates of vocational training skills also receive support from family and friends: 
“Sometimes I am called upon by my friends and neighbours when they want electricity 
installation. In this way, am able to get some money to pay for my computer classes, English 
classes and other things without depending on my parents.” (#15). 
Building on existing social networks and natural processes of “aging out” of extremism and 
delinquency and into more pro-social commitments such as marriage and parenthood, may 
prove successful. The important roles of the family in disengagement and reintegration 
processes have also been seen in Saudi Arabia and Norway (Boucek 2009; Bjørgo 2009). 
In Norway, the “Exit Project,” established in 1997, supported parents with children in racist 
or violent groups: “The parenting network groups proved to be a highly effective method for 
concerned parents in order to get their teenagers out of extremist groups” (Bjørgo, van 
Donselaar and Grunenberg 2009:136). Parents meet within network groups, share 
information, and get a better understanding of what was happening in the groups of which 
their children were a part. Knowledgeable outsiders, such as police officers, researchers, or 
ex-members, were also brought in to provide information and advice: “The network group 
could thereby strengthen the parent’s monitoring, control and ability to provide care for 
their children” (ibid:137).  
The Saudi Arabian “Counseling Program” is another example of a rehabilitation program 
making use of social networks and familial obligations. The program aims to re-educate and 
rehabilitate terrorist sympathizers. It incorporates many traditional Saudi methods of 
conflict resolution and management (Boucek 2009:212–213).The program makes use of 
several important Saudi cultural mores, including social responsibility, notions of honor, and 
the recognition of traditional and extended family hierarchies. 
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For instance, when detainees are released for family events such as weddings or funerals, 
three family members must come forward to guarantee their return; should the detainee 
not return, then those three family members would have to take his place. At the time of 
writing no prisoner has ever used this opportunity to escape. (Boucek 2009:217). 
The Exit Project in Norway and Counseling Program in Saudi Arabia are two examples of 
how to successfully build on social networks and ties in a specific cultural context. In the 
Somali culture, where clan and family structures are strongly grounded, social networks and 
ties may be formally integrated into any efforts of disengagement and reintegration of ex-
combatants. Parents serve as barriers when their children try to engage with Somali armed 
groups and also create exit routes for disengagement. Including close family and relatives in 
the formal reintegration efforts could therefore prove highly beneficial.  
Selection processes 
In conflict-affected areas, experiencing war economies where there are few job 
opportunities, many people, including those outside the target groups, naturally show 
strong interest in DDR programs and projects. In Colombia for example, one challenge for 
the governmental DDR program designed for the right wing paramilitary came in the form of 
‘ghost soldiers.’ These were people not belonging to any armed group who entered the 
demobilization program (Rasmussen and Porch 2008). 
The two informants removed from the sample of ALP graduates had not considered joining 
a piracy group nor were in the target group defined by Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). One of 
them was studying at university level when he enrolled in the project. He heard about the 
NCA training and joined the business-skills training through a contact: “I heard about the 
training from the radio. I knew the teacher of the training and he helped me with the 
registration. I joined the training to make myself a business, and now I have a cafeteria” 
(#21). He is now aiming at finishing his education and getting a job: “I want to finish my 
education, get a degree and work with an international organization” (#21). This is an 
example of an individual who is clearly outside the target group, but was included into the 
project through contacts.  
Some of the participants in the ALP project had already disengaged from piracy groups and 
spent quite some time outside the group before enrolling into the project. They were 
already engaged in other pro-social activities and expressed no plans of re-joining any piracy 
groups. One man was part of a piracy group for four months in 2007. However, he did not 
enroll into the ALP project until 2011: “In between that time, I was helping my father with 
fishing” (#13). As he had already disengaged and had been away from piracy for four years, 
the project was not the pulling factor to disengagement.  
Based on our small sample we are not able to quantify if such cases are exceptions or if 
many outside the target groups are included in the trainings. However, if many such cases 
occur, it would be beneficial to introduce a stronger selection mechanism. A solution could 
be to implement stricter selection processes, including fewer participants but providing 
longer training sessions. 
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Bridging reintegration initiatives and wider recovery and  
development efforts 
A well-designed DDR program should not only enhance basic security but also support wider 
recovery and development efforts (IDDR:33). Even though the ALP project is not a part of 
wider DDR processes, it is a good example of how an international actor has understood and 
embarked on important local processes to address one of the elements of insecurity in the 
region. Through the ALP project, NCA built on grassroots initiatives by religious leaders to 
push people out of piracy groups. The religious leaders and elders traditionally enjoy a high 
status in Somali society and have the credibility to address the piracy issue. 
The notions of haram vs. halal are strongly grounded within communities, and the religious 
leaders successfully use this moral aspect to encourage individuals and communities to say 
no to piracy. Even though the religious leaders managed to reach out to the local population 
morally, they were not able to offer pirates any other profitable alternative when 
disengaging.  
The NCA organized trainings in alternative livelihoods, which religious leaders used as 
incentives for disengagement. Religion was a push factor, and alternative livelihood training 
a pull factor. Combined these two factors provide strong motives and incentives for 
disengagement from piracy. Hence, the ALP project is an example of success in building on 
local processes and efforts, and combining these with components of standard reintegration 
programming.  
Moral communities take action 
An interesting recent development is that local communities have started to mobilize 
against piracy. The NCA and others now claim that Eyl, which has been one of the most 
pirate infested harbors on the east cost of Puntland, is now free from pirates. This is 
apparently the result of the local community taking counter-action. An ex-pirate from Eyl 
said: “There are no pirates in Eyl because the people chased them away. The community put 
pressure on them to either quit or disband them from the community.” (#11) This was 
confirmed by NCA employees in Garowe. In NCA’s annual report for 2010, one of the 
program’s results was coastal communities withdrawing support for pirates.  
The coastal communities, especially Eyl and Bargaal, do not buy or sell goods to the 
pirates, rent their houses nor allow their daughters to be married to the pirates. This has 
forced the pirates to go southwards to Garacad and Hobyo in search of communal 
support. (NCA 2010b, section 2.4.1) 
A 2011 Project Review Report found that pirates also are moving out of Garacad and 
Jarriban in Puntland, to villages such as Haragdheer and Hobyo in South Central Somalia. 
This is a result of efforts on various levels:  
The out-migration is said to be as a result of a combination of efforts, including intense 
government pressure, efforts by the international community and grassroots advocacy by 
non-state actors, particularly NCA through the religious leaders. These efforts have 
generated social rejection of pirates by community. (NCA 2011:8). 
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Investments in local economy 
Investments in local economy and improving infrastructure are crucial parts of recovery and 
development in many conflict and post-war areas. The Minister of Security in Puntland 
strongly argues for investment in the local economy: “What should be done is developing 
and supporting the small industry and local production. There should be invested in airport 
and seaport to strengthen the local economy” (Interview with the Ministry of Security in 
Puntland, May 2011). Such investments are closely linked to reintegration, creating a 
stronger employment base and livelihood opportunities for all. The minister argues that 
there should be a stronger link between reintegration, livelihood projects, and broader 
investment in the local economy:  
There should be investment in three sectors; fishery, livestock and agriculture. This can 
create sustainable solutions. Investing in small industries. The money that has been used 
in the projects (reintegration projects) could have been invested in that sector. Some do 
training within fishery, however the people do not have boats and nets. So it should be a 
package combining these things. That would make much more impact. (Interview with the 
Ministry of Security in Puntland, May 2011).  
Most informants involved in piracy had a background from the fishing industry while others 
were nomads. These are traditionally the two main sectors of livelihood for Puntlanders 
(Puntland State of Somalia 2007:18). Based on limited formal labor-market opportunities in 
the region, it could prove efficient to support reintegration back into traditional ways of 
livelihood, building on already obtained skills rather than introducing them to sectors where 
the unemployment rate might be high and the demand is low. In contexts such as Somalia: 
“Each individual will have some type of skills that he or she is capable of, and the DDR 
reintegration program should be designed to capitalize on this in the best way possible” 
(IDDR:44).  
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Conclusion and main findings 
The first part of this study explored the social and economic entities, processes, conditions, 
and circumstances influencing decisions to join piracy in Somalia, as well as decisions to 
disengage;  this is discussed in terms of engagement/disengagement and push and pull 
factors. However, the findings cannot be generalized to piracy as a whole, as the sample is 
small, consisting of foot “soldiers” in these criminal groups and those individuals who 
decided to disengage. The findings are still relevant, since they offer insights for developing 
or improving interventions.  
In interviews with 16 individuals involved with piracy groups, 15 stated that economic 
conditions and motivations were a main factor in their decisions to join. The lack of 
employment and livelihood served as a push factor, whereas the prospect of economic 
profit was a pull factor. Ideology or political motivations played a minor role in attracting 
them to join pirate groups. However, five ex-pirates stated that they did so in response to 
illegal fishing by foreign vessels. 
Disappointment at the lack of expected profit influenced some decisions to end piracy 
involvement, serving to push them out of the group. Another push factor was the hardship 
and risk involved, mentioned by more than half of those actively involved in piracy.  
Based on the notion of multi-centric communities, this report has unraveled how these 
criminalized individuals are members of a set of partly overlapping social units and networks 
of various outreach, all of which are custodians of religious moral codes that form incentives 
for not engaging and for exiting. More than half of the ex-pirates mentioned strong morally 
condemning statements by local Muslim leaders, family or other members in the local 
community that piracy was haram (forbidden) as a factor in their decision to stop 
involvement. This provided a strong push factor out of piracy. The message of the religious 
leaders was often reinforced by family and community objections to their involvement in 
piracy, motivated both moral arguments and fear about the dangers involved in piracy 
activities.  
Of particular interest was whether decisions to engage and disengage from piracy were 
made alone or under the influence of others. For 14 out of 16 involved with piracy, family 
members or peers had encouraged, facilitated, or pressured them to join. Most joined the 
group with others, but they left the group alone and covertly. However, other family 
members also played important roles in trying to prevent them from joining, as well as 
facilitating their disengagement. The dangers involved, as well as the haram (forbidden) 
nature of piracy, motivated the family to try to keep or get them out of pirate groups. In 
several cases, fathers used their social connections to get their sons enrolled in the 
Alternative Livelihood to Piracy (ALP) project or send them away from the piracy group. 
The second part of the study looked into the Norwegian Church Aid’s (NCA) ALP project in 
Somalia. The project facilitates disengagement and reintegration and offers vocational and 
business-skills training and a seed grant to help ex-pirates start a new life. Generally the 
participants held positive views on the project and its usefulness. For some, the ALP project 
played a vital role as a pull factor in their disengagement process by providing an attractive 
alternative to continued involvement with piracy.  
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A very successful part of the ALP project was the close cooperation with local religious 
leaders, who drew upon Koranic teachings to dissuade youths from piracy. These religious 
leaders also recommended such youths to enroll in the ALP project. The ALP project thus 
seems to have provided a powerful mix of reinforcing push factors out of piracy with forces 
pulling youths into a more rewarding alternative. 
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Recommendations for programming 
 
 Build stronger and more links to the local market and businesses. Expand arrangements 
for internships and apprenticeships with local businesses.  
 Conduct in-depth market surveys mapping the local job opportunities and possibilities 
for developing new businesses. 
 Expand the project period beyond three years in order to provide sustainability, long-
term planning, and capacity building. 
 Extend the duration of the training period and expand to other sectors on the basis of 
findings from the market survey. Introduce follow-up training and advanced courses 
(e.g., six months after graduation). 
 Increase the number of participants in the project (depending on resources). 
 Refine selection criteria and processes for gaining admittance to the project. Establish 
objective criteria in order to counteract selection biases due to gate-keepers with vested 
interests, or social ties to applicants or their families. Project employees should 
interview the final list of candidates before they are accepted, addressing their 
background, their skill level, their needs and their potential for benefitting from the 
project. Screen out applicants who have not been involved in piracy-related activities, 
and those who are already well on their way to reintegration independent of the 
project.  
 Consider to introduce a social contract between the ALP project and the individual 
participants, specifying certain terms with which the participant has to comply in order 
to be accepted into the project, and breaches which may result in expulsion. This may 
include not fighting, committing crimes, or chewing khat during the project period. 
 Improve the M&E framework to better monitor participants. Assess individual outcomes 
after one year. 
 Offer capacity building for local implementing partners in order to increase the quality of 
the trainings. 
 Support families in preventing their children from joining piracy groups, and/or in 
persuading their children to quit piracy. Provide information on their important roles 
and on possible routes of disengagement and reintegration. Invite parents to contact 
religious leaders who take a clear stand against piracy. Inform about the possibilities the 
ALP project can offer individuals who disengage from piracy. 
 Continue programs on education, water, sanitary, emergency aid, livelihood, women’s 
empowerment, and peace projects. These initiatives contribute to prevention of young 
and economically challenged people joining piracy. They also contribute to successful 
disengagement and reintegration. 
 Use ex-pirates to help spread awareness and knowledge about the hardship, risk, and 
disillusionment involved in armed group membership. 
 Maintain and expand capacity building and cooperation with religious leaders who take 
a clear stand against piracy. Develop similar partnerships with elders and community 
leaders. Expand to other piracy-affected areas.  
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Appendix 1  
 
List of interviewed organizations and individuals  
 
Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs (MoJAR), Puntland 
Ministry of Security, Puntland 
Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports, Puntland 
Ministry of Justice, Somaliland 
Ministry of Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Refugees, Somaliland 
The Religious Leaders Organization (under the MoJAR in Puntland) 
Secretariat for Puntland Religious Leaders (under the MoJAR in Puntland) 
UNICEF, Puntland 
Garowe Vocational Training Centre (GVTC), Puntland 
Somalia Relief and Development Organization (SORDO), Puntland 
Somali Women with Vision (SWV), Puntland 
Bossaso District Safety Committee (DSC), Puntland 
Somali Youth Organizations, Puntland 
Regional Marine Conservation Organization (RMCO), Puntland 
Puntland Institute for Development Administration and Management (PIDAM), Puntland 
Two representatives from the elders in Bosasso, Puntland 
Kenya Pastoral Development Agency (NOKEPDA)  
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The International Research Group on Reintegration 
Efforts to ensure social, political and economic reintegra-
tion of former combatants are persistently neglected in 
peacebuilding interventions. This is so, even as reintegra-
tion of former fighters is a central prerequisite for durable 
peace to take hold and for post-war economic reconstruc-
tion to be kick-started. 
The Centre for Peace Studies’ (CPS) International Re-
search Group on Reintegration (IRGR) is currently in 
cooperation with other applied academic institutions and 
international agencies, including the United Nations In-
teragency Working Group on DDR (IAWG-DDR), un-
dertaking interdisciplinary and comparative studies of 
reintegration. Current initiatives build on a four years 
in-depth project with the Norwegian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (NUPI) on the contexts of DDR. Ongoing 
applied research will enable the group to assess strengths 
and weaknesses in current DDR policy formulation and 
programming and contribute to a bolstering of reintegra-
tion efforts in key conflict zones.
The research initiative will solidify the standing of the 
Centre for Peace Studies at the University of Tromsø and 
associated partners as an international hub for expertise 
on reintegration. Complementary to the ongoing IAWG-
CPS collaboration, which also has a focus on customiza-
tion of DDR knowledge products, CPS is in collaboration 
with UNIDIR (Geneva) and Livework (a leading innova-
tor of service design), developing prototypes which may 
enable CPS gradually to take on global service functions 
on reintegration. 
Disarmament and demobilization, the shorter and techni-
cal sides of DDR, usually receive considerable focus and 
resources. Reintegration, however, is understudied and 
critically underfinanced. The work of the IRGR may help 
rectify this by maintaining a deliberate focus on reinte-
gration and substantiate why long-term funding will en-
hance cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding.  An underlying 
premise of current initiatives is that if reintegration, in all 
its facets, is systematically studied, we can generate new 
important evidence-based knowledge that will help future 
reintegration programming. Too little is known about the 
mechanisms that facilitate and play into reintegration pro-
cesses. These need to be recorded, distilled and analyzed 
in order for researchers and practitioners to see common 
patterns and processes, which in turn can shed new light 
on why and how reintegration processes unfold in the way 
they do. Reintegration is an issue gaining importance in 
inter-agency efforts - helping to develop UN-wide tools 
and approaches will therefore provide important support 
to the Integrated Missions concept.    
The IRGR comprises both faculty staff and affiliated lead-
ing scholars on DDR and global security.  Furthermore, 
CPS currently supports young researchers to develop ex-
pert knowledge on DDR and Reintegration in particular. 
CPS’s own PhD and MA students in Peace and Conflict 
Transformation are affiliated with the expert group and 
receive guidance from a group who combine academic 
excellence with dedicated work as practitioners. Several 
of the groups’ members are current or former UN staff, 
including from agencies such as DPKO, UNDP, UNIFEM 
and UNESCAP. The DDR team will offer advice on de-
sign, implementation and evaluation of DDR, as well as 
on institutional capacity building and on mainstreaming 
gender-aware reintegration concerns into large-scale re-
construction and recovery efforts.  
uit.no/peace
